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In the Shadow of Consensus: Communication 









There	 are	 two	 competing	 perceptions	 of	 the	 EU	Council	 and	 its	working	 groups.	 The	 first	 of	 them	
argues	that	the	Council	works	as	a	battleground	for	expressing	the	 interests	of	Member	States	and	
other	 participating	 actors.	 A	 competing	 view	 emphasizes	 the	 effects	 of	 socialization	 and	 informal	
norm	 shaping	 behaviour	 of	 the	 actors	 involved.	 It	 thus	 considers	 the	 Council	 as	 a	 forum	 where	
consensus	 prevails.	 This	 article	 analyses	 how	different	 actors	 acting	 in	 the	Council	working	 groups	
communicate	in	a	formal	way.	Based	upon	analysis	of	non-participatory	observation	of	interventions,	
it	 finds	 that	working	 groups	 tend	 to	 be	 arenas	 for	 real	 bargaining	where	 the	 actors	 enforce	 their	












bodies,	 but	 also	 the	 methods	 and	 approaches	 employed	 in	 the	 studies.	 It	 is	 true	 that	 the	 total	
number	 of	 articles,	 books	 or	 chapters	 has	 increased	 substantially	 in	 recent	 years.	 Existing	 studies	
focus	 primarily	 on	 the	 role	 played	 by	working	 groups	 in	 the	 Council	 political	 process	 (Olsen	 2011;	




This	 study	attempts	 to	 fill	 this	 gap	by	analysing	 interventions	within	 the	working	groups	operating	




characteristics	 of	 these	 actors,	 and	 their	 affiliations.	 Moreover,	 the	 paper	 analyses	 how	 different	
players	contribute	to	the	overall	atmosphere	of	the	working	groups.		
The	main	 findings	of	 the	analysis	may	be	 summarized	as	 follows:	 First,	working	 groups	 tend	 to	be	
more	 competitive	 than	 consensus-oriented.	 Second,	 actors	 differ	 significantly	 in	 their	 behaviour.	
Member	 states	 are	 the	 most	 cooperative	 actor	 followed	 by	 the	 European	 Commission	 while	 the	
Presidency	 focuses	 on	 promoting	 its	 own	 interests.	 Third,	 actor	 affiliation	 does	 not	 play	 a	 role,	 as	
Brussels-based	delegates	does	not	tend	to	adopt	a	more	cooperative	stance	than	do	delegates	from	
the	capitals.	Also	the	length	of	the	EU	membership	does	influence	actors´	behaviour.		










The	 Council	 itself	 consists	 of	 three	 basic	 levels:	 working	 groups,	 preparatory	 bodies	 such	 as	 the	
Committee	of	Permanent	Representatives	(COREPER)	and	the	ministerial	level.	While	the	ministerial	
level	 is	 ordinarily	 treated	 separately	 from	 the	 technical	 and	 semi-political	 dimensions,	 current	
research	 sometimes	 treats	 working	 groups	 and	 preparatory	 bodies	 as	 a	 single	 entity	 or	 similar	
entities1 .	 In	 this	 analysis,	 however,	 I	 take	 into	 account	 only	 the	 working	 groups,	 leaving	 out	
consideration	of	bodies	such	as	COREPER,	the	Antici	Group	or	the	Mertens	Group.	Also	omitted	are	
ad	hoc	and	consultative	committees.		
Working	 groups	 represent	 the	 most	 basic	 element	 of	 the	 Council's	 work.	 Different	 authors	 give	
different	 estimates	 of	 their	 numbers	 –	 usually,	 there	 are	 between	 170	 –	 200	 working	 groups2.	
Fouilleux	 et	 al.	 (2007:	 98)	 maintain	 that	 working	 groups	 should	 be	 embedded	 in	 the	 institutional	
structure	of	the	Council,	consist	of	attachés	from	the	Member	States'	permanent	representation	and	
national	 experts,	 deal	with	 several	 pieces	 of	 legislation	 at	 a	 time,	 exist	 for	 a	 number	 of	 years	 and	
prepare	COREPER	and	ministerial	level	meetings3.		The	function	of	a	working	group	may	be	described	
as	 that	 of	 a	 body	 which	 enables	 the	 negotiation	 of	 Member	 States'	 positions.	 Nevertheless,	 the	
Member	States	are	not	the	only	parties	involved.	Important	roles	are	assigned	to	the	Presidency,	to	
the	 Commission,	 and	 to	 the	 Council	 Secretariat.	 Legislative	 work	 consists	 of	 the	 deliberating	
proposals	 for	 the	 EU	 legislature,	 non-legislative	 activities	 include	 preparing	 Council	 conclusions.	




characterized	 in	 terms	 of	 several	 shared	 features.	 Each	 group	 is	 composed	 of	 one	 or	 more	
representatives	from	each	Member	State,	members	of	the	Council	General	Secretariat,	members	of	
the	Commission	 staff	and	 the	chair.	The	group	 is	 tasked	with	going	 through	 the	 legislative	or	non-
legislative	documents	in	order	to	find	a	compromise	which	maximally	suits	the	parties	involved.	This	
is	usually	done	article	by	article.	While	Member	States	and	the	Commission	primarily	express	 their	
interests,	 the	 Presidency	 is	 supposed	 to	 listen	 and	 try	 to	 find	 a	 compromise	 solution.	 The	 Council	
Secretariat	 is	present	specifically	 in	order	to	explain	 legal	difficulties	and	possibilities.	However,	the	
Council	 Secretariat	may	 go	 beyond	 its	 traditional	 technocratic	 role	 and	 play	 an	 important	 political	
role	(Beach	2007).	Different	types	of	delegates	attend.	Member	States	are	represented	by	the	staff	of	
their	 permanent	 representations	 in	 Brussels.	 These	 attachés	 cover	 one	 or	 more	 working	 groups	
simultaneously.	 They	 may	 be	 accompanied	 by	 national	 experts	 from	 the	 capitals.	 Sometimes	 a	
meeting	may	be	attended	only	by	the	expert	or	only	by	the	attaché.	The	Commission	is	represented	





working	 group´s	 actor	 can	 influence	 its	 business.	 In	 intervening,	 Member	 States	 are	 theoretically	
restricted	by	the	Council's	Rules	of	Procedure,	which	say	that	Member	States	should	not	 intervene	
unless	 they	 are	 proposing	 a	 change	 to	 the	 item	 under	 discussion	 (Council	 Decision	 2009/937/EU,	
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and	 well-developed	 (see	 Pedler	 and	 Schafer	 1996;	 Christiansen	 and	 Larsson	 2007;	 Blom-Hansen	
2011;	Héritier	et	al.	2013).	All	 these	committees	exercise	varied	roles	within	the	EU,	since	they	are	




interests.	Members	 of	working	 groups	 are	 bound	by	 national	 instructions	 based	upon	preferences	
formulated	 in	 their	 home	 capitals.	 These	 preferences	 reflect	 the	 interests	 of	 economic,	 social	 and	
political	actors	from	each	member	state	and	the	outcome	of	bargaining	that	may	need	to	take	place	
at	 this	 level	 in	 order	 to	 establish	 a	 single	 national	 stance	 to	 be	 maintained	 in	 European-level	
negotiations	 (Beyers	 and	Diericks	 1998;	Moravcsik	 1998).	 By	 contrast,	 for	 the	 neo-institutionalists,	
working	 groups	 play	 a	 more	 active	 role.	 They	 are	 seen	 as	 arenas	 within	 which	 preferences	 are	
bargained	 for	 and	 where	 the	 very	 rules	 governing	 such	 negotiations	 are	 defined.	 In	 short,	 the	





role	 of	 working	 groups	 in	 the	 decision-making	 process,	 as	 well	 as	 their	 influence	 and	 capacity.	
Common	 wisdom	 indicates	 that	 working	 groups	 prepare	 and	 decide	 the	 majority	 of	 Council	
outcomes	(Hayes-Renshaw	and	Wallace	1997;	van	Schendelen	1996).	Most	of	these	conclusions	have	
been	 based	 either	 upon	 pure	 estimation	 or	 upon	 information	which	 comes	 from	 insiders.	 Current	
research	 repeatedly	 challenges	 such	 figures.	 Häge	 (2008)	 found	 that	 working	 groups	 were	
responsible	 for	 less	 than	 40	 per	 cent	 of	 decisions,	 Olsen	 (2011:	 159)	 notes	 that	 an	 even	 smaller	
amount	of	decisions,	only	33	per	cent,	are	made	by	working	groups.			
The	second	 line	of	 research	 targets	 the	 issue	of	communication.	Two	works	of	Beyers	and	Diericks	
(1997,	 1998)	 may	 be	 seen	 as	 pioneering	 in	 creating	 systematic	 in-depth	 analyses.	 The	 first	 piece	
aimed	 at	 exploring	 links	 between	 communication	 involving	 national	 delegates	 and	 several	
discretionary	factors,	revealing	that	discretion	matters	(Beyers	and	Dierickx	1997).	The	second	study	
analysed	 the	 form	 of	 communication	 which	 takes	 place	 within	 working	 groups.	 It	 showed	 that	






research	 using	 data	 gathered	 at	 the	 COREPER	 level,	 the	 findings	 suggest	 that	 delegates	 acting	 in	
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these	 groups	 have	 shared	 loyalties,	 both	 to	 the	 group	 and	 to	 their	 respective	 states	 (see	 Egeberg	
1999;	 Beyers,	 2005).	 This	 is	 supported	 by	 several	 studies	 conducted	 by	 Lewis	 (1998,	 2003,	 2005)	
which	state	that	members	of	COREPER	develop	process	and	relationship	interests,	as	well	as	a	sense	
of	 collective	 responsibility.	 Lewis	 claims	 that	 COREPER	 is	 driven	 not	 only	 by	 the	 logic	 of	
consequences,	 but	 also	 by	 the	 logic	 of	 appropriateness	 (Lewis	 2005:	 942).	 Trondal	 and	 Veggeland	




position	 in	 order	 to	 facilitate	 a	 compromise	 in	 working	 groups.	 In	 his	 most	 recent	 study,	 Naurin	
(2015)	 challenges	 the	 prevailing	 conceptualization	 of	 the	 Council	 as	 an	 arena	 where	
intergovernmental	 negotiations	 can	 be	 characterized	 as	 consensual,	 claiming	 that	 particularly	 the	
‘Big	3’	(France,	Germany	and	the	United	Kingdom)	are	unwilling	to	make	generous	concessions.		
The	 prevailing	message	 from	 existing	 research	 seems	 to	 be	 that	 socialization	 takes	 place	 in	 lower	
levels	of	the	Council	(particularly	at	the	COREPER	level)	and	actors	behave	in	a	manner	which	is	far	
from	 being	 driven	 only	 by	 their	 self-interests.	 However,	 all	 research	 relies	 on	 data	 gathered	 from	
insiders5	or	 on	 the	 detailed	 study	 of	 the	 negotiation	 of	 one	 or	 more	 pieces	 of	 legislation.	 This	
approach	is	quite	understandable,	since	the	Council	is	not	one	of	the	most	transparent	institutions	in	
the	EU.	By	relying	on	information	from	insiders,	however,	there	is	a	risk	that	the	data	may	be	biased.	
Firstly,	 insiders	 may	 overestimate	 their	 own	 roles,	 mix	 the	 formal	 versus	 informal	 levels	 of	
negotiation,	or	may	simply	provide	only	that	information	which	they	find	comfortable	to	discuss.	Also	









This	 study	 seeks	 to	 make	 a	 contribution	 to	 the	 research	 on	 the	 communication	 within	 working	
groups.	 It	 focuses	 on	 two	 key	 issues	 –	 firstly,	 it	 studies	what	 kind	 of	 communication	 –	 in	 form	 of	
interventions	–	 takes	place	 in	working	group	meetings.	 Is	 this	 communication	more	cooperative	 in	
















H3:	Of	 the	 collective	actors	 involved,	 the	Presidency	and	 the	Council	 Secretariat	will	 be	 significantly	
more	 cooperative	 in	 communication	 than	 delegates	 representing	 the	 Member	 States	 and	 the	
European	Commission.	
	
H4:	 The	 longer	 a	 particular	 collective	 actor	 is	 part	 of	 a	 working	 group’s	 structure,	 the	 more	
cooperative	in	communication	it	tends	to	be.	
 




adjust	 their	 strategies	 to	 the	 legal,	 informational,	 and	organizational	 opportunities	 and	 constraints	
provided	by	committees	and	multiple	principals,	and	their	behaviour	varies	accordingly.	In	both	cases	
–	 for	 the	 social	 constructivist	 as	 well	 as	 the	 rationalist	 –	 socialization	 has	 an	 effect	 on	 behaviour	
although	the	mechanisms	differ	(Checkel	2005;	Trondal	2007).		
When	 developing	 these	 expectations	 into	 more	 specific	 assumptions,	 it	 can	 be	 argued	 that	 the	
Council	 is	 far	 from	 being	 a	 purely	 intergovernmental	 arena	 which	 serves	 for	 the	 expression	 and	
defence	 of	 national	 interests	 (Aus	 2008)	 and	 as	 such	 there	 is	 a	 strong	 preference	 for	 mutual	
cooperation	among	parties	rather	than	for	contestation	(H1).	Proceeding	to	the	individual	 level,	the	
affiliations	of	delegates	make	a	difference	 in	their	behaviour	 (Fouilleux	et	al.	2007).	Delegates	who	
are	 permanently	 deployed	 in	 Brussels	 share	 a	 sense	 of	 responsibility	 and	 thus	 act	 in	 more	 a	
cooperative	 way	 than	 their	 fellows	 from	 the	 capitals.	 This	 differentiation	 is	 important	 because	
Brussels-based	diplomats	tend	to	behave	and	negotiate	in	different	ways	than	do	national	experts6.	
Succinctly	put,	 the	 former	are	set	 to	adopt	a	more	cooperative	style	 in	negotiating	than	the	 latter.	
(H2).			
The	 socialization	 argument	 is	 also	 valid	 from	 the	 collective	 actors´	 perspective.	 There	 is	 a	 broadly	
accepted	assumption	that	the	Council	Presidency	(H3)	acts	as	an	impartial,	neutral	actor	which	gives	
up	the	pursuit	of	its	own	interests	(Tallberg	2006;	Tallberg,	2008:	187;	Bunse	2008:	39).	Such	claims	
are	 also	 connected	with	 social	 constructivism	or	 sociological	 institutionalism	as	 they	deal	with	 the	
logic	of	appropriateness.	Following	this	concept,	the	Presidency	is	constrained	by	expectations	from	




When	 evaluating	 the	 hypotheses,	 I	 control	 for	 three	 factors	 which	 may	 also	 influence	 actors´	
communication	behaviour.	 Firstly,	 the	 size	of	 the	actor	matters.	 Possession	of	more	 resources	 can	
affect	willingness	 of	 such	 states	 and	 institutions	 to	 cooperate	 or	 act	 independently	 (Naurin	 2015).	
Secondly,	salience	plays	a	role	in	actors´	behaviour	and	their	willingness	to	adopt	a	compromise	on	a	
particular	issue.	There	is	evidence	that	legislative	bodies	in	the	EU	use	their	procedural	powers	more	




to	make	 concessions	 to	 reach	 an	 agreement	 at	 all.	 Thus	 one	may	 expect	 that	 cooperation	 in	 the	
working	 groups	 will	 be	 higher	 when	 dealing	 with	 legislative	 proposals	 than	 when	 preparing	 non-
legislative	 documents.	 Thirdly,	 the	 language	 used	when	 intervening	 can	 also	 importantly	 influence	
the	 degree	 of	 cooperation.	 English	 is	 the	 modern	 lingua	 franca	 in	 the	 Council,	 with	 a	 substantial	
majority	 of	 both	 formal	 negotiations	 and	 informal	 communications	 among	 delegates	 carried	 out	




et	 al.	 claim	 (2003:	 28),	 in	 the	 late	 1990s,	 90	 per	 cent	 of	 non-native	 English	 speakers	 representing	
their	countries	in	the	Council	were	able	to	communicate	to	some	extent	in	English,	and	more	than	80	
per	 cent	 spoke	 English	 well	 or	 very	 well.	 Therefore,	 using	 English	may	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 factor	 which	





The	 data	 employed	 in	 this	 study	 comes	 from	 the	 non-participatory	 observation	 of	 more	 than	 20	
meetings	 of	 various	 Council	working	 groups	 dealing	with	 policies	 related	 particularly	 to	 the	 Single	
Market.	 An	 overview	 of	 meetings	 is	 presented	 in	 Table	 1.	 Working	 groups	 were	 selected	 for	
observation	based	upon	the	willingness	of	relevant	attachés	to	enable	non-participatory	attendance.	
The	working	 groups	 presented	 in	 this	 paper	 thus	 do	 not	 comprise	 a	 comprehensive	 picture	 of	 all	
working	groups	across	all	policy	sectors.	Nevertheless,	this	sample	offers	a	unique	perspective	on	the	
internal	 life	 of	 Council	working	 groups.	 The	observation	 took	place	 from	 the	beginning	of	October	
2013	to	the	end	of	November	2013.	Council	working	groups	usually	work	all-day,	with	a	90-minute	
lunch	 break.	 Sometimes	 groups	 may	 meet	 for	 a	 half-day	 only,	 either	 in	 the	 morning	 or	 in	 the	
afternoon.	
Table	1.	Overview	of	working	groups	
Day	 Working	group	name	 Character	 Agenda	
9.	10.	 G1	–	Competitiveness	and	Growth	 Half	day	 Legislative	
10.	10.	 I01	–	Social	Questions	 Half	day	 Legislative	
15.	10.	 G1	–	Competitiveness	and	Growth	 Full	day	 Non-legislative	
17.10.	 H5	–	Telecommunications	and	Information	Society	 Full	day	 Legislative	
18.10.	 I01	–	Social	Questions	 Full	day	 Legislative	
22.10.	 G1	-	Competitiveness	and	Growth	 Half	day	 Non-legislative	
23.10.	 G7	–	Technical	Harmonisation	 Full	day	 Legislative	
24.10.	 G7	–	Technical	Harmonisation	 Full	day	 Non-legislative	
28.10.	 G23	–	Consumer	Protection	and	Information	 Full	day	 Legislative	
29.10.	 G1	–	Competitiveness	and	Growth	 Full	day	 Legislative	
31.10.	 G12	–	Competition	 Full	day	 Legislative	
5.	11.	 H5	–	Telecommunications	and	Information	Society	 Full	day	 Legislative	
6.	11.	 G1	–	Competitiveness	and	Growth	(High	level	group)	 Full	day	 Non-legislative	
7.	11.	 G1	-	Competitiveness	and	Growth	 Full	day	 Non-legislative	
11.	11.	 G1	-	Competitiveness	and	Growth	 Full	day	 Legislative	
12.11	 H5	–	Telecommunications	and	Information	Society	 Full	day	 Legislative	
18.11.	 G1	-	Competitiveness	and	Growth	 Full	day	 Legislative	
19.11.	 H5	–	Telecommunications	and	Information	Society	 Full	day	 Legislative	
21.11.	 H5	–	Telecommunications	and	Information	Society	 Half	day	 Non-legislative	
Legislative	
25.11.	 A16	–	Friends	of	the	Presidency	Group	(Integrated	Maritime	Policy)	 Full	day	 Legislative	







were	followed	during	the	subsequent	observation	process	 -	 the	actor,	 intervention,	 language	used,	
type	of	delegate	and	the	character	of	the	agenda.	
The	first	variable,	 ‘actor’,	consists	of	 four	values	which	are	used	to	 identify	each	type	of	actor	who	
attended	in	order	to	express	their	views	during	the	working	group	meetings.	The	first	of	these	is	the	
Presidency;	the	second	actor	type	is	the	Member	State;	the	third	is	the	European	Commission;	and	
the	 fourth	 is	 the	 Council	 Secretariat.	 The	 second	 variable	 captures	 the	 content	 of	 interventions	
expressed	by	the	various	actors	during	the	meetings.	Each	type	of	rhetorical	act	was	defined	in	terms	
























This	 division	 of	 interventions	 into	 six	 categories	 is	 based	 upon	 the	 three	 basic	 messages	 that	
delegates	communicate	when	 taking	 the	 floor.	The	 first	of	 these	 is	a	 clear	expression	of	 their	own	
position	or	interest	(‘Position’).	 In	doing	so,	the	delegate	simply	states	what	he	or	she	wants	–	e.g.,	
how	 the	 particular	 Member	 State	 wishes	 to	 rewrite	 a	 specific	 sentence	 or	 document,	 or	 which	
changes	 it	 finds	 acceptable.	 Such	 intervention	 contains	only	 a	demand	and	 is	 not	 accompanied	by	





The	 second	 common	 type	 of	 message	 is	 a	 procedural	 intervention	 (‘Procedure’).	 In	 making	 a	
procedural	 intervention,	 a	 delegate	 may	 wish	 to	 clarify	 further	 proceedings,	 for	 example.	
Interventions	made	by	 the	Presidency	 in	yielding	 the	 floor	 to	other	delegates	are	also	 classified	as	
procedural	 interventions.	 As	 such,	 procedural	 interventions	 are	 treated	 as	 neutral	 in	 their	
contribution	towards	the	atmosphere	in	the	working	groups.	Procedural	interventions	were	included	
into	 the	 dataset	 even	 though	 they	 do	 not	 necessarily	 bear	 any	 message	 directly	 related	 to	 the	






for	 the	work	of	 another	actor	 (‘Support’).	 The	 former	does	not	exclude	an	actor´s	own	preference	
from	the	statement	but	it	always	indicates	his/her	willingness	to	cooperate	or	his/her	awareness	of	
existing	positions.	An	actor’s	position	is,	 in	such	a	case,	present	only	 implicitly.	Support	for	another	
actor’s	 position	 is	 thus	 treated	 as	 factor	 which	 increases	 cooperation	 within	 the	 group.	 The	
remaining	 three	 categories	 are	 based	 upon	 combining	 the	 abovementioned	 three	 kinds	 of	 simple	
interventions.	 First,	 an	 actor	may	 combine	 its	 own	 preference	 with	 an	 emphasis	 on	 a	 procedural	
issue	(‘Position	and	Procedure’)	–	the	 latter	part	of	such	an	 intervention	may	serve	as	an	argument	





all	 interventions	 which	 contain	 support	 for	 another	 actor	 –	 either	 being	 the	 only	 message	 of	
intervention	 or	 being	 accompanied	 by	 procedural	 remark	 or	 by	 speaker´s	 own	 position.	 Value	 0	
(‘Uncooperative’)	on	the	contrary	unites	interventions	bearing	speaker´s	own	position,	either	as	the	
only	content	of	the	intervention	or	being	accompanied	by	commenting	on	procedural	issues.	Purely	
procedural	 interventions	were	not	 included	 into	the	exploratory	analysis	as	the	can	be	classified	as	
neutral.	However,	they	are	presented	and	commented	in	the	descriptive	part	of	analysis	in	order	to	
illustrate	 which	 kind	 of	 actors	 express	 them	 and	 how	 important	 they	 are	 in	 the	 overall	
communication	within	the	working	groups.							
The	 logic	behind	 the	dependent	variable	 (‘Communication)	 is	based	upon	experience	expressed	by	
practitioners8	and	the	Council´s	 internal	norms.	For	the	first,	practitioners	say	that	not	only	what	 is	
said	during	the	meetings	but	how	it	is	expressed	is	highly	significant.	Disagreement	or	dissatisfaction	
with,	 for	 example,	 changes	 made	 by	 the	 Presidency	 may	 be	 expressed	 in	 various	 ways	 which	
substantially	affect	both	the	overall	atmosphere	of	the	meeting	and	the	perception	of	the	speaker.	
Demands	 which	 are	 articulated	 in	 the	 context	 of	 other	 actors´	 positions	 are	 considered	 as	 more	
acceptable	 and	more	 ‘user	 friendly’	 than	 the	mere	expression	of	 the	 speaker´s	 interests.	 Even	 the	
Council´s	 internal	 norms	prefer	 certain	 values	 such	 as	 efficiency,	 consensus	or	 cooperation	 among	
Member	 States.	 For	 example,	 the	 Council´s	 Rules	 of	 Procedure	 considers	 a	 full	 round	 table	 as	
proscribed	 in	 principle	 and	 encourages	 delegations	 to	 express	 their	 demands	 collectively.	 This	






the	 particular	 Member	 State	 was	 coded.	 Lists	 of	 participants	 were	 used	 to	 construct	 a	 variable	
labelled	‘Representative’.	This	captures	whether	a	Member	State	is	represented	strictly	by	a	Brussels-
based	diplomat,	or	by	a	national	expert	coming	in	from	the	capital,	or	a	combination	of	the	two.		
Variable	 ‘Length	 of	 EU	 membership’	 is	 expressed	 as	 the	 number	 of	 years	 an	 actor	 had	 been	 a	
member	 of	 the	 European	 Union.	 When	 it	 comes	 to	 non-state	 actors,	 they	 are	 treated	 as	 having	
existed	 since	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 European	 integration	 process.	 As	 the	 Presidency	 combines	 an	
institution	and	a	member	state	holding	the	office,	the	value	for	the	Presidency	is	computed	as	a	sum	
of	the	length	of	member	state	membership	and	the	length	of	the	Presidency	divided	by	two10.		
Concerning	 the	 control	 variables,	 the	 first	 of	 them	 (variable	 ‘Size’)	 is	 based	 upon	 the	 Panke’s	




not	 vote	 in	 the	 Council,	 its	 overall	 power	 in	 negotiations	 and	 communication	 is	 enormous.	 The	
Commission	 sets	 the	 agenda,	 has	 its	 own	 interests	 in	 negotiations	 and	 thus	 has	 the	 power	 to	
influence	the	negotiation	process	even	at	the	working	group	level.	The	Council	Secretariat	is	treated	
as	a	small	actor	because	it	assists	the	working	groups´	work	and	can	hardly	enforce	its	own	interest.	
When	 it	comes	to	 the	Presidency,	 it	 is	 in	 line	with	 literature	classified	as	a	small	actor	as	well	as	 it	
should	follow	the	norms	of	neutrality	and	impartiality.	The	second	control	variable	‘Language	used’	
captures	the	language	used	during	the	meetings.	The	basic	distinction	is	between	English	and	other	
languages.	 Thirdly,	meeting	agendas	accessible	 in	 the	 room	or	on	 the	Council	website	prior	 to	 the	
meeting	were	used	to	construct	the	variable	‘Item’,	which	divides	the	agenda	between	legislative	and	
non-legislative	issues.		





noting	 the	 interventions	 with	 the	 help	 of	 the	 prepared	 table.	 All	 in	 all,	 during	 the	 meetings,	 the	
research	 gathered	 5021	 interventions	 (including	 procedural	 ones).	 In	 the	 analysis	 that	 follows,	 a	









3	 summarizes	 the	data	used	 for	 the	exploratory	analysis	 in	 terms	of	distribution	of	 the	dependent	
variable	(‘Communication’).	




goes	 smoothly.	 This	 finding	 perfectly	 fits	 with	 the	 role	 of	 the	 Presidency	 as	 described	 in	 the	
literature.	According	to	it,	the	Presidency	should	focus	on	the	role	of	the	chair	who	wants	to	find	a	
common	 interest,	 leaving	 their	 own	 goals	 behind.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 the	 Member	 States	 and	 the	
European	Commission	 intervene	 in	 rather	 substantive	 terms.	Both	actors	 focus	on	expressing	 their	
positions,	but	at	the	same	time	they	also	express	support	for	the	other	parties´	 interests.	Even	this	
picture	 corresponds	 with	 what	 we	 know	 about	 the	 Council	 in	 general.	 The	 Council´s	 General	
Secretariat	presence	is,	in	terms	of	interventions,	almost	invisible	which	is	not	surprising	as	well.			
However,	 if	 purely	 procedural	 interventions	 are	 removed	 from	 the	 sample,	 a	 completely	 different	
picture	emerges.	As	Figures	2	shows,	if	procedural	comments	are	deleted	from	the	dataset,	Member	
States	 become	 dominant	 actors.	 Their	 focus	 on	 interest	 promotion	 and	 coalition	 building	 is	 not	
changed,	which	 is	 the	 case	 for	 the	Commission	as	well.	 This	 is	not	 surprising	 –	 the	Council	 and	 its	
components	are	designed	exactly	for	interest	articulation	and	aggregation.		However,	what	changes	
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working	 groups	 are	 thus	 slightly	 closer	 to	 functioning	 as	 arenas	 of	 intergovernmental	 negotiation	
than	 to	 socialized	 forums	where	 common	 interests	 prevail.	 This	means	 that	 real	 negotiations	 take	
place	there	and	this	formal	level	bargaining	is	 important.	It	can	hardly	be	claimed	that	negotiations	
can	 be	 found	 only	 behind	 the	 scenes	 and	 that	 meetings	 of	 working	 groups	 merely	 present	 the	
outcomes	of	these	unseen	processes.		
Table	3	.An	overview	of	communication	within	working	groups	according	actors	
	 Cooperative	 Uncooperative	 Total	
Actor	 	
Presidency	 54	 311	 365	
Member	States	 963	 1086	 2049	
Commission	 58	 183	 241	
General	Secretariat	 0	 20	 20	
Total	 1075	 1600	 2675	
 
In	the	second	part	of	the	analysis,	a	binary	logistic	regression	was	used	to	investigate	what	types	of	
independent	 variables	 influence	 the	 dependent	 variable	 and	 to	 what	 extent.	 In	 this	 analysis,	 all	







	 B	(SE)	 Wald	 Exp(B)	
Independent	variables	
Actor:	Commission	 .75	(.24)***	 10.10	 2.12	
Actor:	Member	State	 1.78	(.16)***	 117.95	 5.95	
Representative:	Brussels	based	 .11	(.01)	 1.46	 1.12	
Length	of	EU	Membership	 .00	(.00)	 .45	 1.00	
Control	variable	
Item:	Non	legislative		 .58	(.13)***	 20.22	 1.79	
Size:	Big	actor	 -.20	(.11)*	 3.33	 .82	
Language:	Non-English	 .02	(.01)	 .06	 1.02	
	
Constant	 -1.97	 	 	
Nagelkerke	R2	.10	.	***	p	<	0.01,	**	p	<	0.05,	*	p	<	0.01	.	Standard	errors	in	parentheses.		
 
Table	 5	 shows	 fairly	 well	 that	 in	 general	 terms	 the	 model	 does	 not	 explain	 many	 of	 the	
communication	patterns	within	 the	working	groups.	The	value	of	Nagelkerke	R2	coefficient	 is	quite	





When	 it	 comes	 to	 their	 evaluation,	 the	 analysis	 addresses	 a	 few	 interesting	 findings	 –	 in	 terms	 of	
existing	 research.	 Regarding	 the	 actors	 involved,	 the	 Presidency	 –	 if	 ‘stripped	 from	 procedural	
clothes’	–	 is	not	as	cooperative	as	might	be	expected.	Quite	on	the	contrary.	Both	the	Commission	
and	 the	Member	 States	 tend,	 in	 their	 substantive	 interventions,	 to	 be	more	 cooperative	 than	 the	
country	in	the	helm.	These	findings	are	statistically	highly	significant	and	contribute	the	most	to	the	
model´s	 explanatory	 power.	 This	 can	 be	 interpreted	 as	 that	 the	 actor	 characteristic	 is	 the	 most	
decisive	 regarding	 the	 communication	 atmosphere	 within	 the	 working	 groups.	 Even	 though	 the	
General	 Secretariat´s	 interventions	 had	 to	 be	 omitted	 from	 the	 analysis	 –	 which	 weakens	 the	
conclusion	–	H2	cannot	be	supported.						
Also	 the	 third	hypothesis,	 expecting	 that	 the	Brussels-based	delegates	would	be	more	 cooperative	
than	their	capital-based	fellows,	cannot	be	confirmed.	Although	the	analysis	shows	that	the	Brussels-
based	 delegates	 increase	 the	 degree	 of	 cooperation	 in	working	 group	 formal	 communication,	 this	
contribution	to	the	cooperative	atmosphere	within	the	groups	is	not	statistically	significant.		
Last	 but	not	 least,	 the	data	does	not	 support	hypothesis	H4	 either.	 That	means	 that	 regarding	 the	








not	 surprising	–	 the	 legislation	 is	generally	 seen	as	more	 important	 than	non-legislative	points	and	
also	big	actors	tend	to	pursue	their	 interests	more	actively	than	their	smaller	counterparts.	On	the	
other	 hand,	 language	 does	 not	 play	 a	 role.	 There	 is	 no	 significant	 difference	 between	 English	 and	






functioning	 is	 limited.	 The	 existing	 research	 suffers	 from	 two	 major	 shortcomings.	 First,	 it	 places	










shared	 consensus	 among	 scholars	 as	 to	 which	 pattern	 of	 behaviour	 prevails	 in	 the	 Council.	 The	
analysis	 of	 interventions	 supports	 those	 who	 depict	 the	 Council	 and	 its	 components	 as	 an	
intergovernmental	 arena.	 In	 this	 respect,	 for	 example,	 the	 study	 supports	 the	 findings	 of	 Naurin	
(2010),	 who	 sees	 the	 working	 groups	 involved	 more	 in	 argument	 rather	 than	 deliberation.	 This	
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finding	 is	 hardly	 surprising.	Working	 groups	 do	 form	 the	 basic	 level	 at	which	Member	 States	may	
express	 their	 interests	 and	enforce	 them.	The	analysis	however	 shows	 that	even	 the	Presidency	 is	
quite	 active	 in	 this	 regard.	 It	 is	 also	 shown	 that	 as	 its	 comparative	 advantage,	 huge	 amount	 of	
procedural	interventions	can	be	seen,	which	enable	the	Presidency	to	hide	its	demands	and	goals.		
Additionally,	 the	 variety	 of	 working	 groups	 seems	 to	 limit	 the	 possibility	 of	 creating	 any	 ‘spirit	 of	
common	 interest’.	 In	this	sense,	working	groups	differ	substantially	 from	COREPER	where	a	 limited	
group	of	people	meets	twice	a	week.			
To	sum	up,	this	study	suggests	that	working	groups	seem	to	form	a	quite	unique	level	of	the	Council	





Why	 does	 the	 behaviour	 of	 the	Member	 states	 and	 the	 Presidency	 differ?	 There	 may	 be	 several	
explanations	 for	 this.	 For	 the	 first,	 Member	 states	 know	 that	 if	 they	 want	 to	 succeed	 in	 interest	
promotion,	 they	have	 to	 find	partners	and	 form	suitable	coalitions.	As	a	Member	state	 is	always	a	
Member	state,	 it	has	to	do	so	constantly.	The	same	applies	to	the	Commission.	On	the	other	hand,	
the	Presidency	 is	 in	a	different	 role.	For	 the	 first,	 it	 is	a	unique	opportunity	 to	promote	something	
that	is,	for	a	country	in	the	helm,	important.	As	the	Presidency	has	substantive	procedural	power,	it	
may	 hide	 such	 promotion	 in	 the	 ‘procedural	 fog’	 –	 who	 would	 notice	 that	 the	 Presidency	 wants	
something	 if	 such	 a	 demand	 is	wrapped	 in	 the	 typhoon	 of	 procedural	 interventions?	 Additionally,	
each	Presidency	has	some	substantive	agenda.	Even	though	it	should	be	neutral	and	impartial,	it	has	




Regarding	 the	 effect	 of	 socialization	 where	 existing	 research	 suggests	 that	 Brussels-based	
participants	should	be	more	cooperative	than	their	fellows	coming	from	the	capitals;	the	study	does	
not	 confirm	 this	 expectation.	 It	 seems	 that	working	groups	attendants	differ	 from	 those	attending	
the	 COREPER	 –	 and	 here	 it	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 the	 “socialization	 hypothesis”	 is	 based	 upon	
research	 analysing	 COREPER	 activities.	 In	 comparison	 to	 the	 COREPER	meetings	 which	 take	 place	
regularly	twice	a	week	and	usually	last	for	almost	half	of	a	day,	working	groups	meet	less	frequently.	
As	 they	 are	 the	 first	 opportunity	 for	 expressing	 what	Member	 states	 want,	 their	 participants	 use	
them	 in	 this	 way.	 The	 same	 perhaps	 applies	 for	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 length	 of	 EU	membership	
where	one	could	expect	that	socialization	takes	place	as	well.				
There	 are	 of	 course	 limitations	 of	 this	 analysis.	 First,	 this	 study	 took	 into	 account	 only	 a	 limited	
number	 of	 working	 groups,	 particularly	 those	 related	 to	 the	 Single	Market.	 It	 would	 therefore	 be	
valuable	 for	 future	 research	 to	 include	 working	 groups	 acting	 in	 areas	 that	 are	 more	
intergovernmental.	However,	with	the	increased	level	of	intergovernmentalism,	hardly	any	different	
results	 could	 be	 obtained.	 Second,	 the	 study	 focused	 only	 on	 formal	 oral	 communication,	 leaving	
aside	for	example	written	inputs	or	informal	processes.	Additionally,	the	study	builds	upon	research	
that	 dealt	 particularly	with	 the	 COREPER	 level	 of	 the	 Council.	 Such	 a	 point	 of	 departure	 obviously	


















158	 ‘preparatory	 bodies’	 altogether,	 125	 of	 which	 were	 chaired	 by	 the	 Presidency	 and	 33	 of	 which	 were	 chaired	 by	 a	
permanent	 chairman	 (Council	 Secretariat	 2013).	 In	 the	 period	 between	 July	 2000	 and	 December	 2005,	 the	 number	 of	
groups	varied	from	254	to	289	(Häge	2013:	22).	
3	Fouilleux	 et	 al.	 additionally	 say	 a	 working	 group	 should	 ‘have	 a	 change	 of	 presidency	 every	 6	 months’	 (2007:	 	 98).	
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